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 Risky Curves: Do Bernoulli Functions Predict Choice? 
 
Daniel Friedman and Shyam Sunder 
 
It is a veritable Proteus that changes its form every instant. 
-- Antoine Laurent Lavoisier (speaking of phlogiston, quoted in McKenzie, 1960, p. 91) 
 
1. Introduction 
For several decades, economists have modeled choice under risk as expected utility 
maximization. Here utility is represented by a curve, the graph of an increasing function of 
purchasing power. There are many variants on this theme, and much has been written about the 
exact shape of the curve in various regions, the need for a reference point to distinguish utility 
gains from utility losses, the need for a probability curve relating subjective to objective 
probabilities, whether to represent purchasing power as income or as wealth, etc. But such 
concerns are peripheral to the scientific enterprise of prediction. The key question is: can we 
learn enough about the curves to use them to beat naïve extrapolation in predicting behavior in 
novel risky situations?   
This paper briefly revisits the historical origins of received theory. After considering how 
to use the theory to generate testable predictions, it tours 60 years of empirical investigations. So 
far the harvest has been surprisingly slim, mainly because estimates of the curves are so Protean 
-- they shift erratically as the context changes, and exhibit little power to predict choice out of 
sample. We then consider the insights that curves may offer in thinking about risky industries, 
such as finance, insurance and gambling. The essay concludes by suggesting a largely neglected 
approach that might help predict risky choices. 
 
2. The reincarnation of cardinal utility 
Daniel Bernoulli (1738) conjectured that gamblers might use the concave function u(x) = ln x to 
evaluate a particular sort of risky bet. Jeremy Bentham (1789) used an increasing function to 
describe the greater happiness or utility enjoyed from consuming greater quantities of a divisible 
good, and argued that the function should be concave due to diminishing marginal utility. Later 
Marginalists (e.g. Marshall, 1890) noted that diminishing marginal utility implies downward Friedman and Sunder, ―Risky Curves,‖ 6/21/2011  3 
sloping demand curves. Early twentieth century economists such as Allen and Hicks (1934) and 
Samuelson (1938) successfully campaigned against such notions of cardinal utility, mainly on 
the grounds that the postulated functions lacked measurability, parsimony, and generality 
compared to ordinal measures of utility (Andreas, 2010).  
At mid-twentieth century, just as the Ordinalist victory seemed complete, a small group 
of theorists including von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Arrow (1971), Friedman and 
Savage (1948) and Markowitz (1952), built a new foundation for cardinal utility. They proved 
that if a decision-maker’s risky choices satisfy a short list of plausible consistency axioms, then 
there exists a particular utility function (or Bernoulli function, in the increasingly popular 
terminology of Mas-Collel et al., 1995) whose expectation those choices maximize.  
This theoretical proposition launched a popular quest for empirically valid Bernoulli 
functions. Before summarizing the results of that quest, we offer some perspectives on how the 
abstract theory can generate predictions of actual human choices under risk.  
A person’s true Bernoulli function U is unobservable to outsiders, and perhaps is not 
even consciously accessible to that person. However, it is latent in any consistent set of choices. 
The function U maps possible consequences x (e.g., final wealth) into the real numbers. It is 
continuous and strictly increasing and, with mild additional technical assumptions, can be taken 
to be piecewise smooth (twice continuously differentiable except perhaps at a few kinks). Thus 
we can safely assume that U’ > 0 almost everywhere.  
The sign of the second derivative is a priori unrestricted, but the U’’ ≤ 0 case (i.e., a 
concave Bernoulli function) is central. On the one hand, a negative second derivative captures 
diminishing marginal utility, a hallmark of the older cardinal tradition. The logic is simply that a 
rational person will first purchase goods or service units that bring him greatest utility, before 
turning to other units that bring lower utility. On the other hand, by Jensen’s inequality (e.g., 
Royden and Fitzpatrick, 2010), concavity implies risk aversion. Representing a risky situation by 
a non-trivial distribution of monetary outcomes, the expectation EU over that distribution of a 
concave Bernoulli function is less than its value U(Ex) at the expected outcome. A person is 
deemed risk averse to the extent that the certainty equivalent of the risky situation (an x* such 
that U(x*) = EU) falls short of the expected value Ex; the shortfall is called the risk premium. A 
linear Bernoulli function (U’’ = 0) always has a zero risk premium, and thus represents risk 
neutrality.  Friedman and Sunder, ―Risky Curves,‖ 6/21/2011  4 
A Bernoulli function is unique up to a normalization setting the zero point and the scale. 
Intrinsic measures of risk aversion are therefore normalized by the scale, or by U’. A leading 
measure is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion a(x) = -u’’(x)/u’(x). CARA, the one parameter 
family of Bernoulli functions with constant a, takes the form u(x; a) = A – B e
-ax, where A, B > 0 
are arbitrary constants chosen for convenience. Another popular measure is relative risk aversion 
r(x) = xa(x); the CRRA family u(x; r) with constant r(x) = r includes Bernoulli’s original 
suggestion ln x as the special case with r =1.  
The space of all Bernoulli functions is infinite-dimensional and thus might seem 
empirically inaccessible. Fortunately, the Stone-Weierstrass theorem (e.g., Royden and 
Fitzpatrick, 2010) assures us that every Bernoulli function can be approximated arbitrarily 
closely within a well-chosen finite-dimensional parametric family. The empirical task therefore 
is twofold:  
(a) to estimate from an observed set of risky choices a parameter vector θ characterizing a 
function u(x; θ) that closely approximates the true Bernoulli function U, and then, 
(b) to predict subsequent behavior using the fitted function u(x; θ).  
Since risky choices differ across individuals, economists soon recognized that θ might 
differ systematically with age, sex, nationality and other demographic characteristics. Eventually 
they came to recognize that θ might also vary across contexts, such as the way the risky choice 
was presented. We can therefore specify the estimation task (a) schematically by the equation: 
 
θit  = a0 + ad *Demographicsi + ai * Idiosyncrasyi + ac * Contextt + measurement errorit  (1). 
 
Of course, task (a) is scientifically useful only to the extent that it improves performance in task 
(b) of predicting person i’s subsequent choice behavior. 
  
3. The empirical quest, 1950-2010 
The simplest empirical interpretation of the theory is that there is some particular 
Bernoulli function u(x; θ0) common to all. That is, apart from minor individual idiosyncrasies 
and measurement error, risky choice is predicted well by a universal Bernoulli function. This 
function might be linear, or a member of some family such as CARA or CRRA, or perhaps Friedman and Sunder, ―Risky Curves,‖ 6/21/2011  5 
something more complicated. Markowitz (1952, Figure 4) and Friedman and Savage (1948), for 
example, proposed universal functions that have concave as well as convex segments. 
One early study was encouraging in some respects. Edwards (1955) used a series of small 
and larger bets to repeatedly estimate individual utility functions for five male undergraduate 
students. None of the estimated Bernoulli functions departed consistently from risk neutrality, 
and several were consistently almost linear. Edwards used these functions, together with 
estimated subjective probability curves, to predict subsequent choices between pairs of bets. Due 
mainly to the probability curves, the predictions were far better than the naïve 50-50 prediction. 
Demography. When they looked for it, later investigators typically found considerable 
heterogeneity across subjects’ estimated Bernoulli functions. Could these differences be 
explained by demographics? Researchers might have hoped to make useful empirical 
generalizations of the form:  
  Lower middle class American males of age 30 typically have Bernoulli functions well 
approximated in the 5-parameter Friedman-Savage family with θ near (0, 20, 2.5, -1.2, 
2.5), i.e., lower inflection point near income 0, upper inflection point near 20k, and 
CARA coefficients in the three segments of approximately a = 2.5, -1.2, and 2.5.  
  An upper middle income Japanese housewife of age 50 typically has a Bernoulli function 
approximated in the CRRA family with parameter r = 3.0. 
Consider the field experiment reported in Binswanger (1980, 1981, and 1982). For over 
100 male farmers in India, the task was to choose one of eight alternative bets of form (x1, x2) 
with 0 < x1 ≤ x2 and p1 = p2 = ½. The first alternative had no risk with x1 = x2 = 50 points, and the 
last alternative was x1 = 0, x2 = 200. The six intermediate alternatives were chosen so that the risk 
(here proportional to the payoff difference x2 – x1) has the same ordering as the expected value 
(here the simple average payoff (x2 + x1)/2). Binswanger repeated the task with varying stakes. 
His main conclusion was that the farmers tend to be more risk averse at higher stakes.  
More germane to the present discussion, Binswanger (1981, Table 2) estimated the 
impact of demographic characteristics on his chosen risk aversion parameter, essentially 
ln(CRRA). Wealth, schooling, age, and caste all had insignificant coefficients; only Luck had 
significant impact!
1  
                                                            
1 Luck is defined for each subject as the number of trials where he received the higher payoff minus the number with 
the lower payoff. Our tentative interpretation is that farmers who win the small bets early on are more apt to choose 
riskier bets later. Friedman and Sunder, ―Risky Curves,‖ 6/21/2011  6 
Sillers (1980) estimated a roughly similar distribution of risk parameters for Filipino 
farmers. However, despite considerable effort, neither Binswanger nor Sillers found any 
predictive power in the fitted Bernoulli functions for the risky choice of interest—whether the 
farmers adopted ―green revolution‖ techniques. Sillers (1980, p. 211) summarized his results as 
follows.  ―This chapter briefly describes an attempt to use household risk preferences, as 
measured in the experimental game sequence, to test the impact of household risk aversion on 
the rate of fertilizer applied to the dry season rice crop. This effort failed to produce a 
satisfactory test of the importance of this relationship or its direction... .‖ Studies of (male) 
farmers in El Salvador (Walker, 1980) and in Thailand (Grisley and Kellog, 1987) also reached 
negative conclusions.  
  Surely gender is the most prominent demographic variable that might affect Bernoulli 
functions. Responses to survey questionnaires consistently indicate that women on average 
perceive greater risk than men in a variety of personal and social activities, and there is good 
evidence that women are less likely than men to engage in risky activities, legal and illegal. See 
Eckel and Grossman (2003) for a brisk summary. Of course, rather than differences in Bernoulli 
functions, the survey data differences might reflect mainly informational (or response bias) 
differences (cf., Weber, Blais and Betz, 2002) and arrest record differences might reflect mainly 
different opportunities. Harrison et al.’s (2002) field experiment did not reveal any differences in 
estimated risk attitudes by gender or age. 
In principle, laboratory choice data can isolate the impact of gender on Bernoulli functions. 
Many of the dozens of relevant studies seem to corroborate the conventional view that women 
tend to be more risk averse than men. Powell and Ansic (1997), for example, report that their 
female subjects had less negative risk premiums (i.e., were less risk seeking) in laboratory tasks 
than the male subjects. However, there are also several laboratory studies that reach different 
conclusions. In particular, Schubert et al. (1999) find that women subjects on average are more 
risk averse in abstract gambling tasks in the gain domain, less risk averse in the loss domain, and 
not consistently different from men in context-rich tasks in either domain. They conclude: 
Our findings suggest that gender-specific risk behavior found in previous survey 
data may be due to differences in male and female opportunity sets rather than 
stereotypic  risk  attitudes.  Our  results  also  suggest  that  abstract  gambling Friedman and Sunder, ―Risky Curves,‖ 6/21/2011  7 
experiments may not be adequate for the analysis of gender-specific risk attitudes 
toward financial decisions. [p. 385]. 
Table 1 in the Eckel and Grossman (2003) survey lists 24 findings from the 
literature, only half of which corroborate the conventional view; the others conclude that 
there are no systematic differences or that men are more risk averse. The authors 
conclude that the evidence is inconsistent, perhaps due to differences across studies in 
task details. 
  Wealth and age are often thought to be correlated with risk preferences, but there is little 
supporting evidence. Harbaugh et al. (2002) find young children’s choices are consistent with 
under-weighing the low probability events and over-weighing the high probability events. This 
tendency diminishes with age and disappears among adults; age has no other discernable impact 
on risk preferences.  
The literature contains some scattered results regarding ethnicity. Zinkhan et al. (1991) 
found that their Spanish subjects were more willing to take risks than the Americans. Harrison et 
al. (2003) report a field experiment in Denmark that showed no age or gender effects but 
indicated an education effect. Henrich and McElreath (2002) directly estimated the risk 
preferences of two groups of small-scale farmers (Mapuche of Chile and Sanghu of Tanzania) 
and, surprisingly, found them to be risk-preferring decision makers. Sex, age, land holdings, and 
income did not predict risk preferences and wealth was only marginally predictive. The authors 
note that these tribal people rarely engage in cash transactions, and conjecture that gambles in 
more familiar currencies such as livestock might yield different conclusions.  
Yook and Everett (2003) used investment company questionnaires with MBA students to 
assess their risk tolerance and risk capacity scores and found that age and gender played no role 
in explaining their portfolio held in stocks. The income variable loaded significantly, but that 
may have been due to their definition of risk tolerance.
2 
  Leland and Grafman (2003) report a surprisingly negative result. They compare 
normal control (NC) subjects to others who had brain damage in the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (VM). Earlier studies had found large performance differences in one 
                                                            
2 Questionnaires from Investment Technologies, A.G. Edwards & Sons, William Droms, Scudder Kemper, Fidelity 
and Vanguard were used in the study.  On Vanguard’s website (Flagship2.vanguard.com as of May 26, 2004), risk 
tolerance is defined as ―An investor's ability or willingness to endure declines in the prices of investments while 
waiting for them to increase in value.‖ This measure seems likely to be a function of income and wealth.  Friedman and Sunder, ―Risky Curves,‖ 6/21/2011  8 
complicated risky task, and the standard interpretation is that the VM brain structures are 
involved in making risky choices. However, these authors found no significant 
differences between the two groups for any of their simple risky tasks, and cite other 
studies that yielded mixed findings. The authors conjecture that VM brain damage 
affects the way people engage in a task and respond to feedback, but does not affect risk 
preferences per se.  
Harrison and Rutström (2008) apparently is the most comprehensive survey of recent 
laboratory experiments covering the impact of demographics on risk aversion. They argue that 
the most reliable instrument for measuring risk attitudes is the Holt-Laury multiple price list 
(MPL),
3 and report data from two large recent studies using the MPL in their Tables 2 and 3, and 
report another recent study in Table 4. Table 2 indicates that, among the 181 subjects tested at 
Georgia State University, the Hispanic subjects on average have somewhat lower coefficients of 
relative risk aversion, but other ethnicities (Black and Asian) have no significant impact. Nor 
does gender, age or marital status, or any other demographic variable, with three minor 
exceptions. Compared to faculty and staff, students have slightly higher CRRA, and so do 
subjects with upper-middle household income, compared to all other groups with higher or lower 
income. Compared to other majors, business majors had marginally significantly (p = 0.05) 
lower CRRA.  
Table 3 considers 178 student subjects (at University of South Carolina) and finds no 
significant impact of gender, age, ethnicity, major, college year, grade point average, or parental 
education. US citizens were marginally significantly more risk averse. By far the most important 
impact on measured risk aversion was whether the high stakes treatment came before or after the 
lower stakes treatment. Table 4 considers 156 adults of various ages, mostly in Oregon. None of 
the demographic variables had consistent significant impact, although for one subset of tasks 
(gain domain lotteries), measured CRRA increased with age at first and then tapered off, while in 
the loss domain there was only a marginally significant (p = 0.07) interaction effect of age and 
gender.   
                                                            
3 In each row j, the subject chooses between lottery A and lottery B. Lottery A has two prizes close together, e.g., 
xAH = $2 and xAL = $1.60, while the prizes are more extreme in lottery B, e.g., xBH = $4 and xAL = $0.10. The same 
probability pi of getting the larger prize applies to both lotteries in each row, e.g., p1 = 0.10 in the first row, …, p9 = 
0.90 in the ninth row, and p10 = 1.00 in the last row. Virtually all subjects will choose lottery A in the first row and 
lottery B in the last row. A subject who switches to B in the 4
th row, for example, is revealed less risk averse (or 
more risk seeking) than one who switches in the 5
th or 6
th row. Friedman and Sunder, ―Risky Curves,‖ 6/21/2011  9 
To summarize, measured risk aversion is negative for some tribesmen, and it may be 
slightly lower for men, business majors and some Hispanic groups, but the effects are neither 
large nor consistent across measurement instruments or risky choice tasks. All demographic 
characteristics examined in the literature we have found --- including gender, age, income, 
wealth, and ethnicity --- have a much smaller systematic effect than one might have supposed. 
Indeed, most published studies (and one wonders how many studies that never saw the light of 
day) are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the demographics impact coefficient vector ad in 
equation (1) is zero. Hopes now seem groundless that demographic generalizations (such as for 
the hypothetical Japanese housewife mentioned earlier) will ever provide useful predictions. 
Idiosyncracy. A possible reason for the negative results might be that individual 
Bernoulli functions are largely idiosyncratic, analogous to blood types. Age, gender, and wealth 
can’t predict whether a person is A-positive or O-negative, but a single test of blood type gives 
an extremely accurate prediction of reactions to blood transfusions and of subsequent blood test 
results.  By analogy, perhaps we can get predictive power at the individual level, so that risk 
measurements using one instrument might help predict measures with other instruments or (more 
importantly) behavior in new risky tasks. In terms of equation (1), the question is whether the 
coefficient ai is nonzero and is useful for predicting choice behavior. 
 This question is different than the group-level stability question that is more often 
addressed in the literature. It is not without interest to find essentially the same distribution of 
parameter estimates for a particular group of subjects given the same task on a different day. But 
even when such a result holds, it merely suggests that naïve extrapolation of behavior on the first 
day should also predict well the behavior on the second day, without any benefit from the 
intermediate step of fitting a Bernoulli function on the first day’s data. On the other hand, a shift 
in the distribution has implications regarding predictability. For example, Harrison and Rutstrom 
(2008, p.84-85) note a shift towards risk neutrality in the distribution of estimated relative risk 
aversion coefficients when the expected value was shown explicitly in an otherwise standard 
risky choice task. This implies that the estimated coefficient of at least some subjects changed in 
response to an inconsequential change in the task.  
The crucial tests here measure risk preference of the same subject in several different 
ways. For over 100 subjects, Harlow and Brown (1990) compared four different risk attitude 
measures: (a) CRRA estimated from bids in first price auctions with independent private values, Friedman and Sunder, ―Risky Curves,‖ 6/21/2011  10 
(b) responses to the widely used MMPI survey questions, (c) responses to another psychometric 
survey, SSSV, and (d) a physiological measure (platelet monoamine oxidase or MAO 
concentration) known to correlate with the psychometrics. They found weak but significant 
correlations for male subjects between (a) and the other measures,
4 but no relation for female 
subjects. 
  A brief excursion on risk aversion and laboratory auctions may be instructive. Observed 
bids in first-price sealed-bid independent-private-value auctions are typically higher than in 
equilibrium derived from assuming risk neutrality. Risk aversion can account for such 
overbidding, as worked out most carefully in CRRAM (Cox et al., 1988, the model used in (a) by 
Harlow and Brown). Ockenfels and Selten (2005) challenge this explanation, and show that the 
steady state of a plausible adaptive process (IBE, or impulse balance equilibrium‖) also can 
explain overbidding. IBE can also explain the effect of information treatments, but risk aversion 
can only do so if the information treatment for some unanticipated reason were to shift risk 
parameters in just the right way. In theory, risk aversion leads to lower bids than does risk 
neutrality in third price auctions. Kagel and Levin (1993) find that actual bids indeed tend to be 
lower than the risk neutral benchmark when there are only 5 bidders, but tend to be above the 
benchmark, suggesting risk-seeking, when there are 10 bidders.  
Returning to studies that track individual subjects across tasks, Isaac and James (2000) 
found a strong negative correlation between risk aversion as measured in a first price auction and 
risk aversion for the same individuals as measured via the traditional Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
mechanism. The separate measurements corroborate earlier studies, so no additive bias 
correction, nor even a monotone transformation, can account for the inconsistent measurements 
across tasks. Berg et al. (2005) report a similar negative result, and offer the comment: ―…Such 
a result leads to the difficult problem that there simply might not be such things as (risk) 
preferences… ‖ (p. 4213). 
Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) infer risk-seeking preferences when their subjects sell a 
gamble, and infer risk-averse preferences when the same subjects buy the gamble. Several 
studies, including and Berg et al. (1992), and Fong and McCabe (1999) find that the nature of 
                                                            
4 Even this positive result is undercut by the fact that estimates of two other parameters (with no theoretical relation 
to risk) have correlations with (b), (c) and (d) of about the same level of significance. Friedman and Sunder, ―Risky Curves,‖ 6/21/2011  11 
(and personal involvement in) the task and institution and substantially affects measured risk 
aversion.  
At least one field study reports more encouraging results. Harrison et al. (2004) conclude 
that the estimated risk attitudes in Denmark vary across identifiable populations and find 
significant deviation from risk neutrality for sufficiently large lotteries. Unlike Binswanger and 
Sillers, Harrison et al. do not report attempts to use the estimated risk attitudes to predict choices 
in real life out-of-sample risky situations.  
Other field studies reach negative conclusions. Barseghyan et al. (2011) fit a structural 
model including Bernoulli functions to household data on home and car insurance decisions. 
They reject the hypothesis of stable risk preferences; for example, a typical household exhibits 
greater risk aversion in their home deductible choices than in their auto deductible choices. They 
conclude that ―unobserved heterogeneity is not a plausible explanation‖ (p. 593) and ―…our 
results call into question the empirical validity of the assumption of context-invariant risk 
preferences and caution against extrapolating estimates of risk preferences across contexts.‖ (p. 
622). 
  To summarize, our search of the empirical literature up to 2010 suggests that 
demographics have very little impact on parameter estimates θ, and that individual idiosyncrasies 
seem unstable and often shift unpredictably (or even reverse themselves) across tasks. We do not 
yet seem able to identify regularities of Bernoulli functions, much less gained hope that we can 
predict risky choices in new tasks using estimated functions.  
In fairness we should add that only recently have investigators focused on the crucial 
standard of out-of-sample prediction. Wilcox (2011) reports first results of a research program 
that could potentially yield more positive findings. He observes 100 risky choices per day on 
three consecutive days by 80 subjects, and uses 2/3 of the data to fit Bernoulli functions (together 
with subjective probability curves and a decision noise parameter). Wilcox proposes a 
normalization to deal with one sort of context effect, the width of the payoff range. He finds that 
statistical power is surprisingly low, but his design and econometric techniques are sufficiently 
strong to demonstrate that the normalization improves predictions of the 1/3 of the data not used 
in the estimations. Wilcox has not yet demonstrated that the best of his models can outpredict 
naïve extrapolation or can predict well in tasks that differ appreciably from the task used for 
parameter estimation.  Friedman and Sunder, ―Risky Curves,‖ 6/21/2011  12 
4. Risk-based Industries 
Even if it is not possible to predict individual acts of choice from estimated Bernoulli 
functions of individuals, it is still possible that these functions yield valuable insight into 
important macro-level phenomena such as stock and bond markets, insurance, and gambling.  
Stock Market. Markowitz (1952) extended the logic of Bernoulli functions to construct a 
theory of how investors should select stock portfolios, and Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) 
elaborated the equilibrium implications. In particular, they predict a positive linear relation 
between the expected return on any asset and its incremental risk in a diversified portfolio; the 
slope coefficient is called β. Unfortunately, after some initial success, the prediction has fared 
poorly in empirical work (see Figure 1). Leading authorities conclude:  
Like Reinganum (1981) and Lakonishok and Shapiro (1986), we find that the 
relation between β and average return disappears during the more recent 1963-
1990 period, even when β is used alone to explain average returns. The appendix 
shows that the simple relation between β and average return is also weak in the 
50-year  1941-1990  period.  In  short,  our  tests  do  not  support  the  most  basic 
prediction of the SLB (Sharpe-Lintner-Black) model, that average stock returns 
are positively related to market βs. (Fama and French, 1992, p. 428). 
Brealey and Myers (1996) brazenly shift the burden of proof to those who may question 
the theory: ―What is going on here? It is hard to say. …One thing is for sure. It will be very hard 
to reject the CAPM beyond all reasonable doubt.‖ (pp. 187-8). Whatever the source of these 
empirical difficulties—and many sources have been suggested—portfolio theory can no longer 
be counted among the success stories for the standard theory of risky choice. 
Mehra and Prescott’s (1985) equity risk premium puzzle presents another serious 
problem for existing theory. Reasonable calibrations suggest that the stock market returns on 
average should carry a premium of about 0.5 percent above the returns on safest assets, but 
historical premiums average about 10 times this amount; see Mehra 2003, Tables 1 and 2. That 
paper concludes: ―It underscores the failure of paradigms central to financial and economic 
modeling to capture the characteristic that appears to make stocks comparatively so risky.‖  
Bonds.  The familiar bond ratings—by Standard & Poor, Moody’s, and Fitch—are a 
matter of judgment by experts, and reflect mainly their assessment of the chances that the 
borrower will default on the payment of coupons and/or the principal. They are not based on the Friedman and Sunder, ―Risky Curves,‖ 6/21/2011  13 
dispersion of outcomes that lead agents with concave Bernoulli functions to demand risk 
premiums. Of course, investors are ultimately concerned with bond prices and yields, and they 
too are largely a function of default expectations and liquidity. Even with risk-neutral investors, 
one expects to see a higher promised yield on lower-rated bonds simply because their holders 
must be compensated for accepting a higher expected default rate. Thus the higher yields to 
maturity on low-rated bonds cannot be taken as prima facie evidence that bondholders have 
concave Bernoulli functions. 
Insurance. The negative actuarial (i.e., expected) value of insurance policies is often 
cited as evidence of widespread risk aversion. The mere existence of a vast insurance industry,
5 
the usual argument goes, demonstrates the preponderance of concave Bernoulli functions over 
the outcomes of insured events.   
We will argue in section 6 below that there are better explanations, and show that even 
risk neutral people have good reason purchase standard insurance policies.  For now, we simply 
note that, with insurance as with bonds, the relevant risk consideration is the possibility of loss, 
not the dispersion of outcomes. In standard theory, risk-averse decision makers dislike positive 
deviations from the mean as much as they dislike negative deviations. The preponderance of 
downside insurance, and virtual absence of upside insurance, suggests to us that the usual 
argument may be missing something.  
  Gambling. Some eighty percent of US adults report having engaged in gambling at some 
time in their lives, and a significant minority are heavy gamblers. The gambling industry is 
surely large and pervasive enough to deserve theoretical attention.
6  
Just as economists invoke concave Bernoulli functions to explain insurance, they invoke 
convexity to explain gambling—for a convex Bernoulli function, the certainty-equivalent is 
larger than the expected value, making some negative expected value gambles acceptable. 
Indeed, since a mean-preserving spread always increases the expectation of a strictly convex 
Bernoulli function, a rational person with such preferences will, at a fixed degree of actuarial 
unfairness, always seek the largest bet possible. A Markowitz-type Bernoulli function predicts a 
                                                            
5 In 2009, the insurance industry collected $4,066 billion in premiums world-wide, and $1,239 billion in the US and 
Canada alone, accounting for a significant fraction of the economy (Swiss Re 2010, p. 14). 
6 The industry had gross revenue (amounts wagered less the amount paid to bettors) of $92.27 billion worldwide in 
2007 (American Gaming Association www.americangaming.org/about/overview.cfm). If revenue was about 10 
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preference for gambles with an infinite downside, because the convex domain has no lower 
bound. Preferred bets for a Friedman-Savage Bernoulli function u, convex over only a finite 
interval [b, c], are also much more extreme than one might think. John M. Marshall (1984) 
shows that the optimal fair bet (or the optimal bet with a moderate degree of unfairness) involves 
only two possible outcomes a and d such that and u’(a) = u’(d). As shown in Panel F of Figure 2, 
these tangency points lie beyond a and b, the two Bernoulli function’s inflection points, i.e., 
a<b<c<d, so the optimal bet is quite large. Also contrary to common sense, the model predicts 
that over the convex domain the person will always prefer uncertainty over certainty, and at any 
time of day or night is willing to pay to obtain a fair (or moderately unfair) gamble. 
Gambling has provoked a considerable body of research. Most studies regard the 
monetary consequences as important but not the only factor relevant to gambling behavior. 
Maximizing the expectation of a Bernoulli function, however complicated, accounts only for the 
monetary consequences. It ignores the thrill, the hormones, the heart rate and arousal, the bluff, 
the competition, and the show off (see Pope [1983], Anderson and Brown [1984], Wagenaar 
[1988], and McManus, [2003]). We could not find any attempts to empirically isolate the 
monetary and non-monetary consequences of gambling. Extended discussions of the psychology 
of gambling can be found in Michael B. Walker (1992), Gudgeon and Stewart (2000) and 
http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~johnbell/Final/possessionritual.html. 
  Summary. Neither stock nor bond market data provide much empirical support for 
concave Bernoulli functions. The rapid expansion of gambling across the world doesn’t either. 
We will soon show that insurance can largely be explained by analyzing opportunity sets under 
risk neutrality. Empirical support for Bernoulli functions in macro phenomena thus seems to be 
as scarce as in micro-level observations gathered from laboratory and field. 
 
5. Looking Backward  
  The concept of phlogiston, first suggested by Greek philosophers, entered the scientific 
mainstream with the work of Georg Ernst Stahl (1660-1734). Postulated as an invisible 
compressible fluid that carried heat from one object to another, phlogiston appealed to intuition 
and seemed able to organize some disparate physical phenomena such as combustion of charcoal 
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(it released phlogiston) and smelting of metal ores (the metal absorbed phlogiston). However, the 
concept produced vexing puzzles and few novel predictions. The fluid was never isolated in the 
laboratory. After the emergence of Lavoisier’s powerful oxidation/reduction theory in the late 
1780s, phlogiston theory faded away (McKenzie, 1960, chapter 6).   
  Is the Bernoulli function a 20
th century analogue of phlogiston? It is the centerpiece of a 
theory of risky choice anchored by an elegant mathematical representation theorem. Marrying 
Marshallian diminishing marginal utility to risk aversion enhances its appeal.
7 Although students 
often find the theory unintuitive at first, it grows on them and eventually dominates their thinking 
as they become immersed in the discipline.  There is only one problem: the theory has not yet 
delivered the promised empirical goods. Sixty years of intensive search by theorists and 
empiricists in economics, game theory, psychology, sociology, anthropology and related 
disciplines has not yet produced evidence that assuming people to have Bernoulli functions can 
help predict their risky choices. Nor does the idea seem to have helped industry practitioners. 
  Phlogiston theory did not disappear when it encountered puzzles, such as having a 
positive mass in charcoal and some metals such as magnesium, but a negative mass in other 
metals such as mercury. Its proponents constructed elaborate defenses, reminiscent of pre-
Copernican epicycles explaining the movements of planets. Phlogiston did not vanish from 
respectable science until a better theory came along.
8 Even if the lack of supporting evidence is 
acknowledged, expected utility theory will survive until economists are convinced that they have 
something better to replace it.   
  What might that be? Some economists regard Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect 
theory as a leading candidate. We do not share that view. Prospect theory strikes us as an 
especially flexible variation on the standard theme. It postulates an S-shaped value function u 
similar to a Markowitz (1952, Figure 4) Bernoulli function: u is convex below an inflection point 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Research Council, 1999). 
7 Since the presence of a convex segment in their proposed Bernoulli function is inconsistent with diminishing 
marginal utility, Friedman and Savage took pains to deny connections between the old and newer notions of cardinal 
utility by asserting that Bernoulli functions are ―not derivable from riskless choices.‖ (e.g., 1952, p 464). Their view 
does not seem to have taken hold in economics, where DMU and convexity somehow continue to coexist.  
8 And its loyal supporters died. McKenzie remarks, ―Priestley and Cavendish, on whose work much of the new 
theory was based, clung to the phlogiston theory to the end of their lives.‖ Friedman and Sunder, ―Risky Curves,‖ 6/21/2011  16 
z (the reference point from which gains and losses are distinguished) and concave above.
9  By 
itself, the value function predicts that people are risk-seeking in the loss domain, e.g., would not 
purchase insurance even at moderately subsidized prices. To explain unsubsidized insurance 
purchase and other inconvenient behavior, prospect theory supplements the Bernoulli function u 
with a probability curve w similar to that postulated in Edwards (1955) and earlier work. This 
flexibility (together with an unmodeled phase of editing and adjustment) allows prospect theory 
to rationalize a wide range of risky choice data, but we have seen no evidence that it can predict 
individual behavior in new risky tasks; see, among many other papers, Hey and Orme (1994) and  
Harless and Camerer (1994).
10  
6. A Way Forward 
An investigator encountering difficulties should instinctively return to first principles. In 
that spirit we ask: What is risk?  
Since 1950s, economists have equated risk with dispersion of outcomes, typically 
measured in terms of the second moment of the distribution. But that is not the original meaning. 
To older generations of economists, and to virtually all non-economists, risk refers to the 
possibility of harm. Dispersion matters only on the downside; the upside is not considered risky 
except by modern economists.
11 Perhaps it is time to rethink how to quantify risk. 
Risk is multifaceted. Even technically sophisticated bankers distinguish operational risk 
from political risk and do not lump them together with counterparty risk, credit risk or market 
risk. The reason is that different levels and kinds of risk change the opportunity sets available to 
a decision maker in different ways. Our suggestion of the way forward, therefore, is to focus on 
how risk affects opportunity sets, rather than on how preferences interact with dispersion. 
One reason for our suggestion is methodological. Traditionally, economists have 
distinguished themselves among social scientists by setting an austere standard for their work: 
                                                            
9 The value function has at least 3 free parameters even after specifying the reference point z and allowing for a kink 
there. One can normalize the right derivative u’(z+) = 1, but then must specify the left derivative u’(z-) > 1 and at 
least two curvature parameters, e.g., a(x) = a1 > 0 for x > z [―risk aversion for gains‖] and a(x) = a2 < 0 for x < z 
[―risk seeking for losses‖]. 
 
10 As new proposals and variations of prospect theory appear (e.g., Koszegi and Rabin 2007;  Barberis and Huang 
2008), we must await accumulation of empirical evidence on their ability to predict individual choice in laboratory 
as well as field across a range of contexts with generality and economy comparable to competing theories.   Friedman and Sunder, ―Risky Curves,‖ 6/21/2011  17 
put the explanatory burden on potentially observable opportunities such as prices and incomes 
rather than on unobservables such as preferences or beliefs (e.g., Stigler and Becker, 1977). This 
maxim has often led to distinctive predictions and new insights (e.g., Stigler, 1984). Our point is 
that opportunity sets are potentially observable, while Bernoulli functions (and subjective 
probability curves) are not. 
Another reason is the recent development of useful techniques.  Options theory deals with 
one-sided phenomena and has enjoyed increasing success among financial market practitioners 
as well as academic researchers. As explained below, it seems useful for our purposes because 
some of the ways that risky choice interacts with established commitments can be described in 
terms of embedded real options.  
We do not have a full-fledged theory to present, but instead will offer a series of 
illustrative examples. Consider once more the purchase of homeowners’ insurance. What 
additional costs do people incur when they suffer losses from fire, theft, or accidents? It’s not 
just the cost of replacement that matters, but also the time cost and aggravation of making 
temporary arrangements, and the increased difficulty of meeting contractual obligations. Such 
considerations can be captured in contingent opportunity sets, and they lead to new predictions, 
e.g., that homeowners with larger mortgages will carry more life insurance and less 
discretionary fire insurance. More generally, insurance simplifies one’s life by reducing the 
number, diversity, and cost of contingency plans, and indirectly expands the opportunity set. It 
is hard to see how Bernoulli functions can capture these important considerations, or even 
explain life insurance.  
Consider gambling. Pioneers such as Friedman and Savage (1948) thought it could be 
explained by convex segments of unobservable Bernoulli functions, but six decades of empirical 
search has not brought to light stable preferences of that sort. Indeed, Henrich and McElreath 
(2002) found subsistence farmers to be risk-loving in gains, while recent surveys such as 
Harrison and Rutstrom, 2008, p. 90ff, cast doubt that convexity exists in the loss domain. The 
opportunity set approach to risk would re-direct attention to potentially observable 
considerations such as bailout options. For example, one might predict that a low income 
member of a wealthy family is more likely to be a high roller because winning big would give 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
11 Ironically Markowitz, whose portfolio theory made the dispersion measure of risk so commonplace in economics, 
is an exception. Markowitz (1959, p. x) proposed negative semi-variance as a measure of risk and suggested that it 
might provide a better approximation of an individual’s utility function, albeit less convenient than variance).  Friedman and Sunder, ―Risky Curves,‖ 6/21/2011  18 
him clout as well as wealth, while loosing big would only reinforce his current status without 
seriously threatening his survival. 
For routine implementation of the opportunity set approach, we suggest distinguishing 
gross payoff, the stated values of x in the risky gamble, from net payoff, the ultimate change y in 
purchasing power arising from the gamble. For the sake of parsimony, we suggest treating the 
decision maker as if she were risk neutral in net payoff, and assume that she chooses so as to 
maximize the expected value Ey of net payoff. The linear approximation should be quite good 
when the DM is dealing with small-to-moderate stakes and has access to reasonably efficient 
financial markets. For example, a gain or loss of $1,000 today implies a lifetime gain or loss of 
only a few nickels in daily consumption.
12 
It turns out that this rather simple framework can capture a wide variety of risky 
situations. To begin, suppose that a decision maker (DM) is endowed with some obligation z > 0. 
If he fails to meet the obligation, he faces additional costs that can be approximated as a fraction 
a ε (0, 1) of the shortfall. For example, if the DM has a credit card balance of z = $1,000 on the 
monthly statement and pays only $600 by the due date, he will incur an additional cost of $400a, 
where a ≈ .02 is the monthly interest rate. Other obvious examples of z for household DMs 
include mortgage, rent, and car payments. Examples for business firm DMs include payroll 
obligations, debt service, and bond indentures. A biological example is the number of calories z 
needs to maintain normal activity; rebuilding depleted fat stores or muscle tissue incurs 
additional metabolic overhead of at least a = 0.25 and often considerably more (Schmidt-
Nielsen, 1997). 
  Panel A of Figure 2 shows the resulting net payoff y(x) = x-z for x>z and y(x) = (1+a)( x-
z) for x<z. The function is concave and piecewise linear. If z is not precisely known at the time 
the DM makes a risky choice, e.g., if some random cash flow might partly offset the contractual 
obligation, then the expected net payoff y(x) is strictly concave over the support of z.  
  Fiduciary responsibilities also lead to concave net payoffs for the trustee. When she 
obtains a gross payoff for the client far above the expectations, her net payoff is only slightly 
higher than when meeting expectations, but when the gross payoff falls short of expectations her 
net payoff is far lower after taking into account the legal and reputation costs. Progressive 
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income taxes induce a similar relationship between gross and net cash flows: the slope of the 
function y is less at higher x due to higher marginal tax rates.  
  Discrete, irreversible decisions are yet another reason for concave net payoff functions. 
For example, suppose we see someone turn down a job offer whose expected present value 
clearly exceeds that of current salary plus all adjustment costs associated with the move. The 
usual interpretation is that this DM deducts a risk premium. Another possibility is that favorable 
new job offers are more likely for an established incumbent than for a new hire in a new city. 
Thus accepting the new job might extinguish a valuable wait option, whose value a rational DM 
would deduct from the new job offer. Dixit and Pindyck (1994), for example, show that 
deducting the value of such options leads to net payoff that is concave in the gross job offer x.  
  In all these cases, an uninformed outsider—one who observes only gross payoffs—will 
not be able to distinguish a risk-neutral DM with concave net payoffs from a risk-averse DM 
with a linear net payoff function. An observer with better information on net payoffs can make 
the distinction, and avoid the specification error of attributing an unstable concave Bernoulli 
function to a risk-neutral DM with varying net payoff functions.  
There are also plausible circumstances that lead to specification error in the opposite 
direction: a risk-neutral DM can appear to be risk-seeking because his net payoff function is 
convex in gross payoff. A simple example is a tournament whose the only prize P goes to the 
DM with highest x. Assume that each of K>1 contestants draws his gross payoff independently 
from the cumulative distribution G (obtained, for instance, in a Nash equilibrium of effort 
choices). Then the expected net payoff is y(x) =  PG
K-1(x), which tends to be more convex the 
larger the number of contestants.  Panel B of Figure 2 illustrates the example for three 
contestants and uniform distribution G.  
  Business examples include decisions made in the shadow of bankruptcy, or bailout. 
Suppose that failure to meet a contractual obligation z > 0 results in bankruptcy proceedings and 
shortfalls are passed to creditors, as in Figure 2C. The net payoff again is y(x) = x - z for x > z but 
now is y(x) = (1-a)(x - z) for x < z, where a ε (0, 1) is the share of shortfall borne by other parties. 
This yields a piecewise linear convex relationship. Again presence of a random component to 
cash flows would smooth out the graph and make y a strictly convex function over the support of 
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  Bailouts create convex net payoffs in a similar manner. The U.S. savings and loan 
industry in the 1980s is a classic example. While deposit insurance was still in effect (i.e., a > 0), 
rapid deregulation made a whole new set of gambles available to these banks. The convex net 
payoff created an incentive to accept risky gambles in g. Indeed, some of the gambles with 
negative expected gross value have positive expected net value after considering the proceeds 
from deposit insurance; again see Figure 2C. 
Certain opportunity sets would lead an uninformed outside observer to infer that a risk-
neutral DM has a non-linear Bernoulli function with concave and convex segments, as suggested 
by Friedman and Savage (1948) or Markowitz (1952). Indeed, their intuitive justifications for 
these segments can be naturally re-interpreted as arising from opportunity sets that induce 
rational risk neutral people to behave as if they have complicated Bernoulli functions. For 
example, suppose the DM lives in subsidized housing with subsidy rate a > 0 if her income is 
less than or equal to z1, and becomes ineligible for subsidy if actual income (taking into account 
opportunities to disguise it) exceeds z2 > z1.  If ineligible, she spends fraction c > 0 of 
incremental income on housing. Then net income (after housing) is y(x) = yo +(1-a)(x-z1) for x < 
z1, and y(x) = yo + (x-z1) for z1 ≤ x ≤ z2, and y(x) = yo+ z2-z1 +(1-c)(x-z2) for x > z2; see Figure 2D. 
After taking into account uncertainties of cash flows (or uncertainties of being caught and 
evicted for excess income) she would appear to have a smooth Markowitz-type Bernoulli 
function over gross income. Employing a perspective quite close to our own, James and Isaac 
(2001) derive a very similar Bernoulli function in gross payoff given a progressive tax and a 
bankruptcy threshold. 
  Friedman and Savage (1948) motivate their example with a story about the possibility of 
the DM moving up a rung on the social ladder. To sharpen their story a bit, suppose that z1 is the 
threshold income at which the DM moves from the current working class neighborhood to a 
middle class neighborhood with better schools. Suppose that at a lower income z0 the DM puts a 
fraction c>0 of incremental income into private schools or other special expenditures that would 
be redundant in the new neighborhood. Finally, suppose that only at a higher income z2>z1 does 
the family blend in well in the new neighborhood; at intermediate levels one has to spend a 
fraction d>0 of incremental income on upgrading clothes, car, etc. Then, one infers a piecewise 
linear Bernoulli function shown in Figure 2E, which after the usual smoothing, becomes a 
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second in (z1, z2). But the characteristic non-linear shape is the result of the DM’s net payoffs 
y(x) within the available opportunity set, not some sort of intrinsic preferences.  
Marshall (1984) obtains a similar shape for the indirect utility function for income. True 
preferences are assumed to be concave in income and increasing in an indivisible {0, 1} good 
such as residential choice. He mentions other possible indivisibilities including fertility, life, and 
career choice. Hakansson (1970) derives a Friedman-Savage type function in an additively-
separable multi-period setting. The net payoff is expected utility of wealth, given by a Bellman 
equation for the consumption-investment plan, assuming that the Bernoulli function of 
consumption each period is CRRA. The gross payoff is the present value of endowed income. He 
derives the desired Bernoulli function explicitly from particular constraints on investment and 
borrowing.  
  Masson (1972) drops the parametric assumptions and presents a streamlined, graphical 
argument in a two-period setting. Suppose the DM has standard general two-period preferences 
that are homothetic (hence consistent with global risk neutrality), and that consumptions at the 
two dates have decreasing marginal rates of substitution. Masson shows that realistic capital 
market constraints can create concave or mixed functions y(x), where x is first period endowment 
and y is maximized utility in a riskless world. For example, suppose the borrowing rate b exceeds 
the lending rate l. Then the DM will borrow so y’= b when realized x is sufficiently small, and 
will lend so y’= l when realized x is sufficiently large. For intermediate values of x the DM 
consumes all of the incremental first period endowment, and y’= MRS, which decreases 
smoothly from b to l. Thus risk-neutrality in y induces Bernoulli function in x that is concave, 
and strictly concave over stakes such that it is not worthwhile to adjust one’s bank account. 
Masson obtains Markowitz and Friedman-Savage type induced Bernoulli functions when the 
borrowing and lending rates are not constant. 
  Chetty (2002) derives an even more complex shape for an indirect utility function of 
wealth. He assumes overall concave preferences with frictional costs of deviating from a 
commitment to the current level of consumption decisions for one good (e.g., housing) and no 
such costs for the other good. The resulting net payoff function inherits from the overall function 
its concavity over the upper and lower extremes of gross payoff, features increased local 
curvature for small changes in g from the base level, joined by kinks (locally convex portions).  Friedman and Sunder, ―Risky Curves,‖ 6/21/2011  22 
  Finally, it may be worth revising the St. Petersburg Paradox that first inspired Bernoulli. 
A gamble that pays 2
n rubles with probability 2
-n for every n = 1, 2, …∞, has expected value 
1+1+1+…=  ∞, but nobody will pay an infinite amount to play such a gamble. Bernoulli (1738) 












We acknowledge that utility may eventually diminish, but to us a more satisfactory 
resolution is to note that the opportunity set of the DM is bounded. The person offering the 
gamble must have finite ability (and willingness) to honor a promise; above some value 2
n = B, 
say, he is likely to default. Thus even a risk-neutral gambler should be willing to play no more 
than the expected value of the first n(B) =[ln B/ln 2] terms. In presence of upper bound B = one 
million rubles, the willingness to pay is less than 20 rubles.   
  To summarize, our suggestion for a way forward to a better understanding of risky choice 
is careful analysis of observable opportunity sets of DMs. In particular one should identify the 
relationship y(x) between gross and net payoffs, and see how far the simple risk neutral model 
can take us.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks. 
Extant theories of risky choice center on non-linear Bernoulli functions, but sixty years of 
empirical work has not yet made them operational. Instead of abandoning the approach, 
economists have proposed ever more complicated variants: utility functions with kinks, 
transformations via the distribution function (or rank-dependence), and subjective probability 
curves.  
It is conceivable that such persistence will eventually pay off. Perhaps advances in 
econometric technique and larger scale experiments in the lab and field will isolate regularities in 
estimated Bernoulli functions that actually are useful in out-of-sample prediction. In terms of 
equation (1), this means finding stable context coefficients or idiosyncratic coefficients, or 
perhaps fairly simple interactions. (Of course, arbitrary interactions will not help predict out-of-
sample.)  Another possibility is that advances in neuroeconomics will make Bernoulli functions 
observable (for example, see Knutson and Bossaerts, 2007). If so, the free parameter issue would 
be resolved and that would become a promising way forward. So far, however, the research Friedman and Sunder, ―Risky Curves,‖ 6/21/2011  23 
suggests no simple mapping from brain processes to psychological and economic constructs, and 
we do not believe that a breakthrough is imminent.  
Other approaches are available to applied theorists and empirical researchers who do not 
expect to succeed in the next few years where the previous 60 years have failed. Our own 
suggestion is to return to the roots of choice theory, and put the explanatory burden on 
potentially observable opportunities rather than on unobservable utilities and beliefs. Stigler and 
Becker (1977) proposed this as a general standard for economics research, and Friedman and 
Savage (1948) and Markowitz (1952) can be re-interpreted as nice examples of this approach. 
The foundations of finance are being reconstructed using options theory instead of risk aversion, 
and we believe parallel efforts hold great promise for other aspects of economics, including 
models of risky choice.  
The academic literature on risky choice is vast, spread across many disciplines, and well 
beyond our capacity to read or review. We have tried our best (within personal constraints) to 
track down relevant studies and evidence, but it would be a miracle if we have not missed 
important and relevant pieces of work (and in the process created our own sampling bias as a 
matched twin of the familiar publication bias towards studies that find positive results.) We hope 
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Figure 1: Portfolio Mean Returns versus Their Market Risk 
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Figure 2: Net Payoff Functions (y = net payoffs; x = gross payoffs) 
Panel A. Additional cost a>0 on shortfall from z  Panel B. Tournament payoff 
 
 
Panel C. Bailout a>0 for shortfall from z  Panel D. Means-tested subsidy (Markowitz) 
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